

Preface

...everything turns on grasping and expressing the True not only as *Substance*, but equally as *Subject*. At the same time it is to be observed that substantiality embraces the universal, or the *immediacy of knowledge* itself, as well as that which is *being or immediacy for knowledge*. [17] [BB: Cf. [18], [25], [32], [37], [39], [54], and [65].]

Further, **the living Substance is being which is in truth *Subject***, or what is the same, is in truth actual only in so far as it is the **movement** of positing itself, or is **the mediation of its self-othering** with itself. **This Substance is, as Subject, pure, *simple negativity***, and is for this very reason **the bifurcation of the simple**; it is the doubling which sets up opposition.

Only **this self-restoring sameness**, or this **reflection in otherness within itself**—not an *original* or *immediate* unity as such—is the True. **It is the process of its own becoming, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal, having its end also as its beginning; and only by being worked out to its end, is it actual.** [18]

The True is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development...

For mediation is nothing beyond self-moving selfsameness, or is reflection into self, **the moment of the 'I' which is for itself pure negativity or, when reduced to its pure abstraction, *simple becoming***. The 'I', or becoming in general, this mediation, on account of its simple nature, is just **immediacy in the process of becoming**, and is the immediate itself. [21]

Already something thought, the **content** is the property of **substance**; existence [Dasein] has no more to be changed into the form of what is in-itself and implicit [Ansichseins], but **only the implicit—no longer merely something primitive, nor lying hidden within existence, but already present as a recollection—into the form of what is explicit, of what is objective to self** [Fürsichseins]. [29]

But the Life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures it and maintains itself in it. **It wins its truth only when, in utter dismemberment, it finds itself.**

It is this power, not as something positive...On the contrary, **Spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it**. This **tarrying with the negative** is the magical power that converts it [the negative] into being. This power is identical with what we earlier called **the Subject, which by giving determinateness an existence**

in its own element supersedes abstract immediacy, i.e. the immediacy which barely is, and thus is **authentic substance: that being or immediacy whose mediation is not outside of it but which is this mediation itself**. [32]

The disparity which exists in consciousness between the 'I' and the substance which is its object is the distinction between them, the *negative* in general. [37]

...experience is the name we give to just this movement, in which the immediate, the unexperienced, i.e. the abstract, whether it be of sensuous [but still unsensed] being, or only thought of as simple, becomes alienated from itself and then returns to itself from this alienation, and is only then revealed for the first time in its actuality and truth, just as it then has become a property of consciousness also. [36]

...Now although this negative appears at first as a disparity between the 'I' and its object, it is just as much the disparity of the substance with itself. Thus what seems to happen outside of it, to be an activity directed against it, is really its own doing, and Substance shows itself to be essentially Subject.

Being is then absolutely mediated; it is a substantial content which is just as immediately the property of the 'I', it is self-like or the Notion.

With this the Phenomenology of Spirit is concluded. [37]

To know something falsely means that there is a disparity between knowledge and its Substance. But **this very disparity is the process of distinguishing in general, which is an essential moment [in knowing]. Out of this distinguishing...comes their identity, and this resultant identity is the truth...Disparity, rather, as the negative, the self, is itself still directly present in the True as such.** [39]

This truth therefore includes the negative also, what would be called the false, if it could be regarded as something from which one might abstract. **The evanescent itself must, on the contrary, be regarded as essential, not as something fixed, cut off from the True...**

Appearance is the arising and passing away that does not itself arise and pass away, but is in itself, and constitutes actuality and the movement of the life of truth.

The True is thus a vast Bacchanalian revel, with not a one sober; yet because each member collapses as soon as he drops out, the revel is just as much transparent and simple repose. Judged in the court of this movement, the single shapes of Spirit do not persist **any more than determinate thoughts do**, but they are as much positive and necessary moments, as they are negative and evanescent.

In the whole of the movement, seen as a state of repose, what distinguishes itself therein, and gives itself particular existence, is preserved as something that

recollects itself, whose existence is self-knowledge, and whose self-knowledge is just as immediately existence. [47]

Science dare only organize itself by the life of the Notion itself. The **determinateness**, which is taken from the schema and externally attached to an existent thing, **is**, in Science, **the self-moving soul of the realized content**. The **movement** of a being that **immediately** is, consists partly in **becoming an other** than itself, and thus becoming its own immanent **content**; partly in **taking back into itself this unfolding** [of its **content**] or this existence of it, i.e. in making *itself* into a moment, and **simplifying** itself into something **determinate**. In the former movement, *negativity* is the **differentiating** and positing of *existence*; in this **return** into self, it is the becoming of the *determinate simplicity*.

It is in this way that the **content** shows that its **determinateness** is not received from something else, nor externally attached to it, but that it determines itself, and ranges itself as a moment having its own place in the whole. [53]

The determinateness seems at first to be due entirely to the fact that it is related to an other, and its movement seems imposed on it by an alien power; but having its otherness within itself, and being self-moving, is just what is involved in the simplicity of thinking itself; for this simple thinking is the self-moving and self-differentiating thought. It is its own inwardness, it is the pure Notion. Thus common thought [Verständigkeit] too is a becoming, and, as this becoming, it is *reasonableness* [Vernünftigkeit]. [55]

...in speculative [begreifenden] thinking, as we have already shown, **the negative belongs to the content itself**, and is the *positive*, both as the *immanent movement* and determination of the **content**, and as the whole of this **process**.

Looked at as a result, **what emerges from this process is the determinate negative** which is consequently a positive content as well. [59]

Speculative [begreifendes] thinking behaves in a different way. Since **the Notion is the object's own self, which presents itself as the coming-to-be of the object**, it is not a passive Subject inertly supporting the Accidents; it is, on the contrary, **the self-moving Notion which takes its determinations back into itself**. In this movement the passive Subject itself perishes; **it enters into the differences and the content, and constitutes the determinateness, i.e. the differentiated content and its movement, instead of remaining inertly over against it**. The solid ground which argumentation has in the passive Subject is therefore shaken, and **only this movement itself becomes the object**. [60]

Science of Logic

[These are the last 7 ‘graphs of the *Science of Logic*]

1. Consequently, just as the absence of content in the above beginnings does not make them absolute beginnings, so too it is not the content as such that could lead the method into the infinite progress forwards or backwards. From one aspect, **the determinateness which the method creates for itself in its result is the moment by means of which the method is self-mediation and converts *the immediate beginning into something mediated***. But conversely, it is through the determinateness that this mediation of the method runs its course; **it returns *through a content* as through an apparent *other* of itself to its beginning in such a manner that not only does it restore that beginning-as a *determinate beginning* however-but the result is no less the sublated determinateness, and so too the restoration of the first immediacy in which it began**. This it accomplishes as *a system of totality*. We have still to consider it in this determination.

2. We have shown that **the determinateness which was a result is itself**, by virtue of the form of simplicity into which it has withdrawn, **a fresh beginning; as this beginning is distinguished from its predecessor precisely by that determinateness, cognition rolls onwards from content to content**. First of all, this advance is determined as beginning from simple determinatenesses, **the succeeding ones becoming ever *richer and more concrete***. For **the result contains its beginning and its course has enriched it by a fresh determinateness**. The *universal* constitutes the foundation ; the advance is therefore not to be taken as a *flowing* from one *other* to the next *other* .**In the absolute method the Notion maintains itself in its otherness, the universal in its particularization**, in judgement and reality; **at each stage of its further determination it raises the entire mass of its preceding content**, and by its dialectical advance it not only does not lose anything or leave anything behind, but **carries along with it all it has gained, and inwardly enriches and consolidates itself**.

3. **This expansion may be regarded as the moment of content**, and in the whole as the first premiss; the universal is *communicated* to the wealth of content, immediately maintained in it. But the relationship has also its second, negative or dialectical side. The enrichment proceeds in the *necessity* of the Notion, it is held by it, and each determination is a reflection-into-self. **Each new stage of *forthgoing*, that is, of *further determination***, is also a **withdrawal** inwards, and the greater *extension* is equally a *higher intensity*. The richest is therefore the most concrete and most *subjective*, and that which withdraws itself into the simplest depth is the mightiest and most all-embracing. The highest, most concentrated point is the *pure personality* which, solely through the absolute dialectic

which is its nature, no less *embraces and holds everything within itself*, because it makes itself the supremely free-the simplicity which is the first immediacy and universality.

4. It is in this manner that each step of the *advance* in the process of further determination, while getting further away from the indeterminate beginning is also *getting back nearer* to it, and that therefore, what at first sight may appear to be different, the retrogressive grounding of the beginning, and the *progressive further determining* of it, coincide and are the same. The method, which thus winds itself into a circle, cannot anticipate its development in time that the beginning is, as such, already something derived ; it is sufficient for the beginning in its immediacy that it is simple universality .In being that, it has its complete condition; and there is no need to deprecate the fact that it may only be accepted *provisionally* and *hypothetically*. Whatever objections to it might be raised-say, the limitations of human knowledge, the need to examine critically the instrument of cognition before starting to deal with the subject matter-are themselves *presuppositions*, which as *concrete determinations* involve the demand for their mediation and proof. Since therefore they possess no formal advantage over the *beginning* with the subject matter against which they protest, but on the contrary themselves require deduction on account of their more concrete content, their claim to prior consideration must be treated as an empty presumption. They have an untrue content, for they convert what we know to be finite and untrue into something incontestable and absolute, namely, a *limited* cognition determined as *form* and *instrument relatively to its content*; this untrue cognition is itself also the form, the process of seeking grounds, that is retrogressive. The method of truth, too, knows the beginning to be incomplete, because it is a beginning ; but at the same time it knows this incompleteness to be a necessity , because truth only comes to be itself through the negativity of immediacy. The impatience that insists *merely* on getting beyond the *determinate-whether* called beginning, object, the finite, or in whatever other form it be taken-and finding itself immediately in the absolute, has before it as cognition nothing but the empty negative, the abstract infinite; in other words, a *presumed* absolute, that is presumed because it is not *posited*, not *grasped*; grasped it can only be through the *mediation* of cognition, of which the universal and immediate is a moment, but the truth itself resides only in the extended course of the process and in the conclusion. To meet the subjective needs of unfamiliarity and its impatience, a survey of the *whole* may of course be given *in advance-by* a division for reflection which, after the manner of finite cognition, specifies the particular of the universal as something *already there* and to be awaited in the course of the science. Yet this affords us nothing more than a picture for *ordinary thinking* ; for the genuine transition from the universal to the particular and to the whole that is determined in and for itself, in which whole that first universal itself according to its true determination is again a moment, is alien to the above manner of division, and is alone the mediation of the science itself.

5. By virtue of the nature of the method just indicated, the science exhibits itself as a circle returning upon itself, the end being wound back into the beginning, the simple ground, by the mediation ; this circle is moreover a *circle of circles*, for each individual member as ensouled by the method is reflected into itself, so that in returning into the beginning it is at the same time the beginning of a new member. Links of this chain are the individual sciences [~~of logic, nature and spirit~~], each of which has an *antecedent* and a *successor-or*, expressed more accurately, *has* only the *antecedent* and *indicates* its *successor* in its conclusion.

6. Thus then logic, too, in the absolute Idea, has withdrawn into that same simple unity which its beginning is; the pure immediacy of being in which at first every determination appears to be extinguished or removed by abstraction, is the Idea that has reached through mediation, that is, through the sublation of mediation, a likeness correspondent to itself. The method is the pure Notion that relates itself only to itself; it is therefore the *simple self-relation* that is *being*. But now it is also *fulfilled being*, the *Notion that comprehends* itself, being as the *concrete* and also absolutely *intensive* totality. In conclusion, there remains only this to be said about this Idea, that in it, first, the *science of logic* has grasped its own Notion. In the sphere of *being*, the beginning of its *content*, its Notion appears as a knowing in a subjective reflection external to that content. But in the Idea of absolute cognition the Notion has become the Idea's own content. The Idea is itself the pure Notion that has itself for subject matter and which, in running itself as subject matter through the totality of its determinations, develops itself into the whole of its reality, into the system of the science [of logic], and concludes by apprehending this process of comprehending itself, thereby superseding its standing as content and subject matter and *cognizing the Notion of the science*. Secondly, this Idea is still logical, it is enclosed within pure thought, and is the science only of the divine *Notion*. True, the systematic exposition is itself a realization of the Idea but confined within the same sphere. Because the pure Idea of cognition is so far confined within subjectivity, it is the *urge* to sublimate this, and pure truth as the last result becomes also the *beginning of another sphere and science*. It only remains here to indicate this transition.

7. The Idea, namely, in positing itself as absolute *unity* of the pure Notion and its reality and thus contracting itself into the immediacy of *being*, is the *totality* in this *form: nature*. But this determination has not *issued from a process of becoming*, nor is it a *transition*, as when above, the subjective Notion in its totality *becomes objectivity*, and the *subjective end becomes life*. On the contrary, the pure Idea in which the determinateness or reality of the Notion is itself raised into Notion, is an absolute *liberation* for which there is no longer any immediate determination that is not equally *posited* and itself Notion; in this freedom, therefore, no transition takes place; the simple being to which the Idea

determines itself remains perfectly transparent to it and is the Notion that, in its determination, abides with itself. The passage is therefore to be understood here rather in this manner, that the Idea *freely releases* itself in its absolute self-assurance and inner poise. By reason of this freedom, the form of its determinateness is also utterly free-*the externality of space and time existing absolutely on its own account without the moment of subjectivity*. In so far as this externality presents itself only in the abstract immediacy of being and is apprehended from the standpoint of consciousness, it exists as mere objectivity and external life; but in the Idea it remains essentially and actually [*an und fur sich*] the totality of the Notion, and science in the relationship to nature of divine cognition. But in this next resolve of the pure Idea to determine itself as external Idea, it thereby *only* posits for itself the mediation out of which the Notion ascends as a free Existence that has withdrawn into itself from externality, that completes its self-liberation in the *science of spirit*, and that finds the supreme Notion of itself in *the science of logic as the self-comprehending pure Notion*.